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ANTI-REMOVAL STATUTES RELATING TO INSUR-
ANCE COMPANIES
Missouri and a majority of the states have statutes which provide
in effect that if any foreign or non-resident insurance company, incor-
porated unde' the laws of any other state and doing a local business
under authority of the Superintendent of Insurance, shall remove any
suit from the state to the Federal courts, or institute any proceeding
in any Federal Court against a resident of the state, it shall forthwith
be the duty of the Insurance Commissioner to revoke the license and
all authority of such Insurance Company to do business within the
State.
Several similar statutes applicable to railroad companies which do
an interstate business have been declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and on this account it is fre-
quently asserted with much vigor that the Statutes relating to insurance
companies must also be unconstitutional if a strict logic be consistently
applied.
However, under the authority of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, there is no question at present that State
Statutes are constitutional which provide for the cancellation of the
license of a foreign insurance company in the event that it removes
a suit from the State to the Federal Court. It is held that the
question of the constitutional right of the insurance company to remove
is not at all involved. The only question is the power of a state to
impose the terms on which a foreign insurance company can receive
a license to do business or to continue to do business.
The subject has been discussed by the Supreme Court in more
than a dozen important cases, and some confusion has existed owing
to the fact that corporations engaged in interstate commerce, such as
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railroad and telegraph companies, cannot be treated altogether as
the state is permitted under the law to deal with a foreign insurance
company doing only a local business. The cases, therefore, fall into
two classes: first, those relating to insurance companies, and, second,
those relating to corporations engaged in interstate commerce. There
are two cases in the first division:
Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535;
Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 248.
All of the other cases are in the second division and relate to
interstate commerce.
The Doyle and Prewitt cases are discussed and distinguished in
all of the decisions in the second division relating to interstate com-
merce, but have never been overruled, and are today the law on this
question. In both cases, the corporations whose licenses were revoked
were foreign insurance corporations, which could not possibly engage
in any other than a local business, under the well-settled rule that
insurance is not commerce.
The distinction between the two groups of cases is one based upon
an interference with interstate commerce. In the Doyle and Prewitt
cases it was held, and in all the subsequent cases it was recognized,
that a state could, with or without reason and without violating the
Constitution, fix the terms on which a foreign insurance company could
do business, and revoke its permit to do business within its limits. In
the case of a company engaged in interstate commerce another and
different qtestion arises. There the state's power is not absolute, and
the constitutional right to remove cannot be interfered with. The
Supreme Court has held (226 U. S. 204) that the right to carry on
interstate commerce is not a privilege granted by the state, or to be
interfered with by the State, but is a right which every citizen of
the United States has a right to exercise without the imposition of
any restrictions by the State. In case of the insurance company, how-
ever, there is no reason why the state may not impose any restriction,
reasonable or unreasonable, as a condition to doing business.
In the Doyle case, which went up from Wisconsin in 1876, a for-
eign insurance company had complied with the local statute, and had
received a license to do business in the State. Afterward, it removed
into the Federal Court a suit brought against it in a State Court of
Wisconsin. The state authorities threatened to revoke its license. The
company filed a bill in the Federal Court praying for an injunction
to restrain the revoking of the license. The Supreme Court said,
when the case went there:
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"A license to a foreign corporation to enter a state does not
involve a permanent right to remain, subject to the laws and
constitution of the United States. Full power and control over
its territories, its citizens and its business belong to the state.
"If the state has the power to do an act, its intention or the
reason by which it is influenced in doing it cannot be inquired
into. Thus the pleading before us alleged that the permission of
the Continental Insurance Company to transact its business in
Wisconsin is about to be revoked, for the reason that it removed
the case of Drake from the State to the Federal Court.
"If the act of an individual is within the terms of the law,
whatever may be the reason which governs him, or whatever may
be the result, it cannot be impeached. The acts of a state are
subject to still less inquiry either as to the act itself or as to the
reason for it. The State of Wisconsin (except so far as its con-
nection with the Constitution and laws of the United States alters
its position) is a sovereign state, possessing all the powers of the
most absolute government in the world. * * *
"* * * If the act done by the state is legal, is not in vio-
lation of the Constitution or Laws of the United States, it is quite
out of the power of any court to inquire what was the intention
of those who enacted the law. * * *
"* * * If the state has the power to cancel the license
it has the power to judge of the cases in which the cancellation
shall -be made. It has the power to determine for what causes
and in what manner the revocation shall be made.* * * The
state may compel the foreign company to abstain from the Fed-
eral Courts or to cease to do business in the state. It gives the
company the option. This is justifiable because the complainant
has no constitutiowal right to do business in that state; that state
has authority at any time to declare that it shall not transact busi-
ness there.
"This is the whole point of the case and without reference
to the injustice, the prejudice or the wrong that is alleged to exist,
must determine the question. No right of the complainant under
the laws of Constitution of the United States by its exclusion from
the state is infringed; and this is what the state now accom-
plishes. There is nothing, therefore, that will justify the inter-
ference of this court."
The Doyle case was frequently cited and distinguished by the
Supreme Court of the United States during the next twenty years.
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It was followed and approved in 1906 in a decision of Mr. Justice
Peckham in the Prewitt case (202 U. S. 246). In this case, the
Supreme Court sustained the constitutional validity of a Kentucky
Statute, providing, among other things, that if a foreign insurance
company should remove a suit to the Federal Court, without the con-
sent of the other party, any permit previously granted to it to do
business in Kentucky should be forthwith revoked. No other question
was determined. Mr. Justice Peckham approved the decision in the
Doyle case and said that as the state had the right to entirely exclude
such company from doing business in the state, the means by which
it caused such exclusion, or the motives of its action, were not the
subject of judicial inquiry. Some question had been raised as to
whether or not the case of Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, had
not overruled the Doyle case. As to this, Mr. Justice Peckham
held that the Doyle case had not been overruled and that "if it had
been the intention of the court in Barron v. Burnside to overrule the
Doyle case, it was easy to have said so." Mr. Justice Peckham then
went on to say, at page 257:
"As a state has power to refuse permission to a foreign
insurance company to do business at all within its confines, and
as it has power to withdraw that permission when once given,
without stating any reason for its action, the fact that it may
give what some may think a poor reason or none for a valid act
is immaterial.
"Counsel for the companies, in their brief, admit that the
statet 'has the right at any time to pass a statute expelling a com-
pany or revoking its license, and the validity of the statute of
expulsion would not be affected by the motives of the state in so
doing, when though the preamble expressly recited that the li-
cense was revoked because the company had removed a case.
The statute would be vadid-for the company had no constitu-
tional right to remain in the state any longer than it chose to
allow; and the statute would not abridge any right of removal-
for, as the case had already been removed before the statute was
in existence, the right of removal could not be said to have been
hindered or abridged by a statute not even in existence.'
"Thus it is admitted that a state has power to prevent a
company from coming into its domain, and that it has power to
take away its right to remain after having been permitted once to
enter, and that right may be exercised from good or bad motives,
but what the companies deny is the right of a state to enact in
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advance that if a company remove to a Federal Court its license
shall be revoked.
"We think this distinction is not well founded. The truth is
that the effect of the statute is simply to place foreign insurance
companies upon a par with the domestic ones doing business in
Kentucky. No stipulation or agreement being required as a con-
dition for coming into the state and obtaining a permit to do
business therein, the mere enactment of a statute which, in sub-
stance, says if you choose to exercise your right to remove a case
into a Federal Court, your right to further do business within
the state shall cease and your permit shall be withdrawn, is not
open to any constitutional objection. The reasoning in the Doyle
case we think is good."
The dissenting opinion in this case by Mr. Justice Day, concurred
in by Mr. Justice Harlan, indicates how thoroughly the court con-
sidered every question that was then or has since been advanced
against the constitutionality of the law. The following quotations
from this dissenting opinion indicate the strength and nature of the
arguments unsuccessfully contended for:
"If a state may lawfully withhold the right of transacting
business within its borders, or exclude foreign corporations from
the state upon the condition that they shall surrender a constitu-
tional right given in the privilege of the companies to appeal to
the courts of the United States, there is nothing to prevent the
state from applying the same doctrine to any other constitutional
right, which, though differing in character, has no higher or better
protection in the Constitution than the one under consideration.
If the state may make the right to transact business dependent
upon the surrender of one constitutional privilege, it may do so
upon another, and finally upon all. * * *
"Conceding the right of a state to exclude foreign corpo-
rations, we must not overlook the linitaion upon that right, now
equally well settled in the jurisprudence of this court, that the
right to do business cannot be made to depend upon the surrender
of a right created and guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
If this were otherwise, the state would be permitted to destroy
a right created and protected by the Federal Constitution under
the guise of exercising a privilege belonging to the state, and, as
we have pointed out, the state might deprive every foreign cor-
poration of the right to do business within its borders, except
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upon the condition that it strip itself of the protection given it
by the Federal Constitution. * * *
"While we concede the right of a state to exclude foreign
corporations from doing business within its borders for reasons
not destructive of Federal rights, we deny that the right can
be made to depend upon the surrender of the protection of the
Federal Constitution, which secures to alien citizens the right
to resort to the courts of the United States. * * *
"This court has repeatedly said that such right of exclu-
sion was qualified by the superior right of all citizens to enjoy
the protection of the Federal Constitution. The Federal authority
gives no right to deny to the citizens of a state access to the local
courts of a state. For wise purposes the Federal Constitution
has provided courts for citizens of different states, believed to
be free from local influence and prejudice, and laws have been
passed by Congress to make the privilege of resort to them
effectual. In our view no state enactment can lawfully abridge
this right or destroy it, directly or indirectly, by affixing heavy
penalties to its assertion by those lawfully entitled to its enjoy-
ment."
Since 1906, the Supreme Court has not directly passed on this
question in an insurance case, but it has discussed the principles
involved in the Doyle and Prewitt cases on numerous occasions, and
in 1914, in the case of Harrison v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. R.
Co., 232 U. S. 318, Chief Justice White, in delivering an opinion
relating to the removability of causes by a foreign interstate railway
carrier, took occasion to review the Doyle and Prewitt cases, in view
of the insistence of counsel that those cases were improperly decided.
Chief Justice White said:
"The proposition that the constitutionality of the statute and
the action taken under it is supported by the decisions in Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, and Security Mut. L. Ins.
Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 248, is, we think, plainly unfounded.
Those cases involve state legislation as to a subject over which
there was complete state authority; that is, the exclusion from
the state of a corporation which was so organized that it had no
authority to do anything but a purely intrastate business, and the
decisions rested upon the want of power to deprive a state of its
right to deal with a subject which was in its complete control,
even though an unlawful motive might have impelled the state
to exert its lawful power. But that the application of those cases to a
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situation where complete power in a state over the subject dealt
with does not exist has since been so repeatedly passed upon as
to cause the question not to be open. Western U. Teleg. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; Inter-
national Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 216 U. S. 91; Buck Stove & Range
Co. v. Vickers. 226 U. S. 205, and Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. R. Co., 218 U. S. 135. The grounds of the decision in the
last case show the extremely narrow scope of the rulings in the
Doyle and Prewitt cases, and render their inapplicability to this
case certain. Indeed, the ruling in the Herndon case and in those
subsequent to the Doyle and Prewitt cases, most of which were
reviewed in the Herndon case, demonstrated that no authority is
afforded by those two cases, for the conception that it is within
the power of a state in any form, directly or indirectly, to destroy
or deprive of a right conferred by the Constitution and the laws
of the United States."
This is the last reference to the Doyle and Prewitt cases by the
Supreme Court of the United States and seems to leave the
authority of those decisions in full force, while indicating their inapplic-
ability to the case of a corporation engaged in interstate commerce.
In practically all of the second group of cases relating to foreign
corporations doing an interstate business, the distinction between the
two groups is clearly noted and the court on several occasions indi-
cated that an interstate railway or telegraph company, acting as a
common carrier, or serving the Government in transporting the mails,
troops, munitions of war and sending messages for the Government,
cannot be denied the right to operate, conduct or do any business
within a state through which its line runs, because it removes a suit
brought against it from the State Court to the Federal Court. The
states cannot deny to these federal corporations the right to enter
the states or do business in the states; neither can they announce con-
ditions for noncompliance with which the federal corporations will
be excluded from the states, and it is inconceivable that a state could
exclude from its borders the federal corporations used as Government
agencies, when these corporations decline to surrender their right to
litigate in the Federal courts. Therefore while a state may not deprive
a foreign corporation engaged in interstate commerce of its right to
remove cases, there is nothing to interfere with the right of the state
to dictate the terms on which a foreign corporation shall be licensed
to do a local business within the state, and to make those terms as
difficult, unpleasant or onerous as it pleases. In the case of corpo-
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rations engaged in interstate commerce a constitutional right is in-
volved, and not merely the right of the state to exclude a corporation.
In the Prewitt case, the Supreme Court stated the general rule
which has always obtained in our jurisprudence that a corporation, a
mere artificial person, chartered under the laws of one state, not
engaged in interstate commerce, could not migrate to another state
and exercise its powers there without the consent of that state. As
a foreign corporation has no right to come into the borders of another
state to do a local business, the court held that such state might deny
it admission in the first instance, or not having prescribed conditions
in advance and merely permitted the foreign corporation to remain
by mere sufferance, or by comity, might, nevertheless, afterward
entirely expel it for removing a suit to the Federal,court, or for any
other reason or motive which the state might deem sufficient.
In one or two cases where foreign corporations engaged in inter-
state commerce had prior to the passage of the anti-removal statutes
acquired a property interest in the state, the decisions were made to
turn upon this propcrty right and upon the fact that by afterward
denying the right to such corporations to remove cases to the Federal
court the "equality" clause of the Constitution was violated by depriv-
ing the foreign corporation of equal protection of the laws with the
domestic company which, had the right to resort to the Federal Court.
In the case of Herndon v. C., R. I. & P. R. Co., 218 U. S. 135, the
Supreme' Court held that the license or permit to do local business
given to a foreign interstate railway company which had come into the
state in compliance with its laws, and had acquired, under the sanction
of the state, a large amount of property within its borders, could not
be revoked under the authority of the Missouri Act of March 13, 1907,
and the company subjected to penalties because it brought a suit in a
Federal Court, especially where a domestic railway company might
bring suit in the Federal Court or in a proper case remove one thereto,
without forfeiting its right to do business or inucrring a liability
to penalties. Both the "equality" and "due process" clauses seem to
have been applied in this case, and the Court said:
"This is not a case where the state has undertaken to pre-
vent the coming of the corporation into its borders for the pur-
pose of carrying on business. A corporation was within the state,
complying with its laws, and had acquired, under the sanction
of the state, a large amount of property within its borders and
had thus become a person within the state within the meaning
of the Constitution and entitled to its protection."
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A railroad or telegraph company has a continuing right to do
business in the state both by virtue of the Federal and State laws,
and it might acquire a property right to continue to do business without
being disturbed by a subsequently adopted anti-removal statute. On
the other hand, a foreign insurance company, in Missouri at any rate,
does not have and has not had since 1869, a continuing right to do
business, but secures merely an annual license which must be renewed
from year to year in order to permit it to do business at all. There-
fore, when the anti-removal statute was passed in Missouri, in 1907,
there were no insurance companies which had any rights that were
more than a year old, and all of them must of necessity have had
their licenses renewed within a year. So it is not likely that an insur-
ance company could be held to have acquired such property right prior
to the passage of the anti-removal statute in 1907 as would entitle it
to come within the terms of the Herndon case.
In the case of Western Union Teleg. Co. vs. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1,
an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, who had dissented in the Prewitt
case, reviews all of the decisions and again distinguishes between
foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce and those doing
a purely local business, and discusses in particular the Doyle and
Prewitt cases. He said.
"The vital difference between the Pewitt case and the one
now before us is that the business of the insurance company,
involved in the former case, was not, as this court has often
adjudged, interstate commerce, while the business of the telegraph
company was primarily and mainly that of interstate commerce.
A decision such as was rendered in the Prewitt case, that a state
could, with or without reason, and without violating the Consti-
tution, revoke its permit to a foreign insurance company to do
business of a domestic character within its limits, cannot be cited
as authority for the proposition, upon which the Kansas Statute
rests, that a state may prescribe such regulations as to corpo-
rations of other states engaged in both interstate and local busi-
ness, as will require them, as a condition of their doing local
business, that they shall contribute a given amount, out of their
capital stock, representing all their business, interstate and do-
mestic, wherever done, and all their property, wherever located,
in or outside of the state for the support of the state's schools.
The Prewitt case by no means recognized any uncontrollable
power in a state to prohibit all foreign corporations, in whatever
business engaged, from doing business within its limits. On the
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contrary, this court said in that very case that 'a state has the right
to prohibit a foreign corporation from doing business within its
borders unless such prohibition is so conditioned as to violate some
provision of the Federal Constitution;,' citing various adjudged
authorities, among them the case of Hooper v. California, 155
U. S. 648. In the latter case, the court recognized, as long set-
fled, the general principle that the right of a foreign corporation
to engage in business within the state depended solely on the will
of such state. But it took especial care to say that the interstate
business of a foreign corporation was a business of an excep-
tional character, and was protected by the Constitution against
interference by state authority. The cases referred to in support
of that view are the same as those 'hereinbefore cited in this
opinion. If it be true that the Statute of Kansas, by its necessary
operation, imposes a burden on the interstate business of the
telegraph company, and subjects its property and business outside
of -that state to taxation, then the constitutional validity of the
statute, in the particulars adverted to, may be here adjudged
without any reference whatever to the judgment in the Prewitt
case, and without re-examining the grounds upon which that
judgment rested. The court did not intend by its judgment in
the Prewitt case to recognize the right of Kentucky by any reg-
ulation as to foreign insurance companies, to burden interstate
commerce, or to tax property located and used without its limits.
It could not have done so without overruling numerous decisions
of this court on that subject. On the contrary, as we have seen,
the court in that case distinctly recognized the principle that a
state could not make any prohibition whatever as to a corpo-
ration doing business within its limits that would be in violation
of the Federal Constitution. In respect to the point actually
decided in it, we leave the Prewitt case and the objections urged
against the doctrine it announces wholly one one side, and go
no further now than is indicated in this opinion."
It will be observed that Mr. Justice Harlan in his decision took
no exception to the authority of the Prewitt case in which he had
dissented.
The Doyle and Prewitt cases have been so repeatedly approved
that the Supreme Court is not now likely to overthrow them after
it has so frequently distinguished and reaffirmed them. The Su-
preme Court is much less likely than any other court to overrule its
own decisions, particularly cases which it has so definitely refused to
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overrule. Whatever, therefore, may be the logic of the argument
against the soundness of the law announced in those cases, they stand,
after many a bitter attack, as the law declaring the constitutionality
of the anti-removal statutes insofar as they relate to insurance com-
panies, and I seriously doubt whether the Court would again con-
sider the question.
THOMAS G. RUThEDGE.
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